Cornell Law Library

Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

8-1982

Working Conceptions of "The Law"
Robert S. Summers
Cornell Law School, rss25@cornell.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub
Part of the Judges Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Legal History, Theory and
Process Commons
Recommended Citation
Summers, Robert S., "Working Conceptions of "The Law"" (1982). Cornell Law Faculty Publications. Paper 1198.
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/1198

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

ROBERT S. SUMMERS

WORKING

CONCEPTIONS

1. PREFATORY

OF "THE LAW"

NOTE

This exploratory essay is an admixture of amateur psychology,
moral theory, and jurisprudence. It grows out of seminars I have
given for judges, and reflects that focus.1 Co-theorists will now
see some of what I have been telling practitioners. And error in my
story may be exposed. But one can have no qualms about this. It
is especially important to have things put right for judges.
2. INTRODUCTION

I will consider the work of judges in civil law cases, and will begin
with one of many possible examples. In 1809, English judges
decided a now famous case, one with extraordinarily wide-ranging
influence. The full original report of the case reads as follows:
Butterfield v. Forrester
(1809) 11 East 60 (KB)
This was an action on the case for obstructing a highway, by means of which
obstruction the plaintiff, who was riding along the road, was thrown down
with his horse, and injured, &c. At the trial before Bayley J. at Derby, it
appeared that the defendant, for the purpose of making some repairs to his
house, which was close by the road side at one end of the town, had put up a
pole across this part of the road, a free passage being left by another branch
or street in the same direction. That the plaintiff left a public house not far
distant from the place in question at 8 o'clock in the evening in August, when
1 Several ideas in this essay were presented in June 1978 to judges in seminars at Madison, Wisconsin, and at the Harvard Law School. I am indebted to
these judges for comments. I am grateful to Professors David Lyons and
Roger C. Cramton for helpful criticism. I also wish to thank Mr Leigh Kelley
and Mr Erik M. Jensen, Cornell Law School classes of 1980 and 1979, respectively, for valuable research and editorial assistance.
Law and Philosophy 1 (1982) 263-289.
S02.70
0167-5249/82/0012-0263
Copyright ? 1982 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A.
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they were just beginning to light candles, but while there was light enough
left to discern the obstruction at 100 yards distance: and the witness, who
proved this, said that if the plaintiff had not been ridingvery hardhe might
have observed and avoidedit: the plaintiff however,who was ridingviolently,
did not observeit, but rode againstit, and fell with his horse and was much
hurt in consequence of the accident; and there was no evidence of his being
intoxicated at the time. On this evidence Bayley J. directed the jury, that if
a person riding with reasonable and ordinary care could have seen and
avoided the obstruction; and if they were satisfied that the plaintiff was
riding along the street extremely hard, and without ordinary care, they
should find a verdict for the defendant: which they accordingly did. [The
plaintiff moved for a new trial.]
Bayley J. The plaintiff was proved to be ridingas fast as his horse could
go, and this was through the streets of Derby. If he had used ordinarycare
he must have seen the obstruction;so that the accident appearedto happen
entirely from his own fault.
Lord EllenboroughC.J. A party is not to cast himselfupon an obstruction
which has been made by the fault of another,and availhimself of it, if he do
not himself use common and ordinarycaution to be in the right. In cases of
persons ridingupon what is consideredto be the wrongside of the road, that
would not authoriseanother purposely to ride up against them. One person
being in fault will not dispensewith another'susingordinarycare for himself.
Two things must concur to supportthis action, an obstructionin the road by
the fault of the defendant, and no want of ordinarycare to avoid it on the
part of the plaintiff. [New trial denied.]

As interpreted by most subsequent judges (though not without
some license), the foregoing precedent stands for the so-called
"complete bar" rule to the effect that if a plaintiff is contributorily negligent, he may not recover any compensation from a defendant whose negligent act or omission also contributed to the plaintiff's loss. (There are qualifications but we need not go into them
here.)
Now consider a second case (my summary of the report):
Makiv. Frelk
SupremeCourt of Illinois, 1968
239 N.E.2d 445
Decedent was killed in an auto collision at an intersection. The plaintiff was
administratrixof the decedent's estate and was suingthe defendant, driverof
the other car, for wrongful death. In counts one and two of the complaint,
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the plaintiff alleged that the decedent exercised due care for his own safety
(was not contributorilynegligent), and that the defendantnegligentlycaused
the accident by drivingtoo fast, failing to keep a proper lookout, failing to
keep his car under control, and operatinga car without adequate brakes. In
the third count, the plaintiff did not allege the decedent's own freedom from
contributorynegligence,but did allegethe defendant'snegligence,and alleged
that if there was any negligence on the part of the decedent, the plaintiff
could still win because the decedent's negligence,if any, "was less than the
negligence of the defendant,when compared."
The trial judge granted the defendant'smotion to strike this third count
on the basis of Illinois case law following Butterfield v. Forrester.The intermediate court of appealsreversed,andthusrepudiatedButterfieldv. Forrester.
However, on appealto the highestcourt of Illinois, the trialjudge's rulingwas
affirmed.
Thus, in 1968, a majority of judges of the Illinois Supreme
Court in Maki v. Frelk purported to follow Butterfield v. Forrester
and its progeny faithfully.2 Yet one of the acknowledged leaders
among American scholars of tort law had already called the "complete bar" rule the "harshest doctrine known to the common
law,"3 a characterization that may be justified especially since the
doctrine precludes even a slightly negligent plaintiff from recovering anything from a grossly negligent defendant. In 1945 the
English had abandoned this precedent by a statute apportioning
recoverable damages in accord with estimates of each negligent
party's share of responsibility for the loss.4 By 1968, several
American state legislatures had followed suit.5 Subsequently, the
highest state courts of a few American states (e.g. Florida, 1973

2 One
justification the judges offered for this course cf action was that, in
their view, any changeshould come from the legislature.I cannot go into this
complex issue here.
3 L. Green,'Illinois
NegligenceLaw',Illinois Law Review 39 (1944): 36.
4 See generally Glanville L. Williams, 'The Law Reform (Contributory
Negligence)Act, 1945', Modem Law Review 9 (1946): 105-186.
5 Victor E. Schwartz,
ComparativeNegligence (Indianapolis:Allen Smith,
1974), pp. 12-15.
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and California, 1975) acted on their own to abandon the complete
bar rule.6
What explains Maki v. Frelk? The various factors that influence
judges are numerous and complex, and they vary somewhat from
judge to judge. For my purposes, however, it is not necessary to
try to offer a comprehensive

account.

There are at least four

possible explanations for the Illinois court's refusal in Maki v.
Frelk to abandon the "harshest doctrine known to the common
law": (1) the judges believed (what, in my view, would be mistaken) that only the Illinois legislature had power to modify the
"complete bar" rule, or (2) the judges simply failed to reason
through the conflicting considerations as they should have and
decided against the plaintiff, even though, according to the allegations, the defendant was partly responsible, or (3) the judges, in
deciding the case, were unduly influenced by a particular working
conception of "the law," and this led them to uphold the harsh
doctrine, or (4) some combination of the foregoing.
The working conception most likely figuring here in an explanation of the third possible kind is easy enough to identify: "The
law" governing an issue to be decided consists of a pre-existing
rule 7 - the "complete bar" rule of Butterfield v. Forrester. Judges
unduly influenced by this working conception would vote to
uphold the harshest doctrine known to the common law. Of
course, such a working conception does not itself require this
result. It is only a working conception, and judges not obsessed
with it would not give it an undue or disproportionate place in
their thinking. Instead, they would vote to overrule a case like
Butterfield v. Forrester (unless they rightly believed that the
matter should be left only to the legislature). In voting to overrule,
6

Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1-226
(1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
7 The most influential of AmericanJudges, OliverWendellHolmes,Jr., once
put it this way: "My job is to play the game according to the rules." (L.
Hand, 'Address',in ContinuingLegalEducationfor ProfessionalCompetence
and Responsibility (Philadelphia:Joint Committee on Continuing Legal
Education, 1959), p. 119.)
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these judges would be abandoning,for this case, "the law" that
their workingconception had put them on to and would be turning to other normativephenomenaof "the law" that shouldhere
have primacy. These other phenomena include (1) the law's
commitmentto the reassessmentof precedentin light of reason
and (2) the discretionarypowerof commonlawjudgesto overrule
unsoundprecedent.
In this essay, I will concentrateon the roles of workingconceptions in judicialdecisions.I will not try to provethat this factor
actually helps explain the decision in Maki v. Frelk. Nor, of
course, will I try to establishthe generalextent to whichjudges
are influencedby theirworkingconceptions.But frommy reading
of opinions over many years,and from numerousdiscussionswith
judges, I have concludedthat such conceptionsdo playimportant
roles, both for good and for ill. They can facilitatesounddecision
making.Indeed,one would hope that this is the usualresult.Some
judges, however,become preoccupiedwith their workingideas of
"the law." And there is evidencethat this sometimesaffects outcomes. Theseconclusionsshouldsurpriseno one. Workingconceptions are useful (in ways I will try to explain). Indeed,they are
pragmaticnecessities for most judges. That some proportionof
judgeswill becomepreoccupiedwith such conceptionsseems more
or less inevitable.
It would help if judges were more conscious of the possible
adverseeffects of becomingpreoccupiedwith a workingconception of "the law," and I offer this essay partlyto that end. Judges
conscious of the limits of their working conceptionswill be far
less likely to become imprisonedin them. I also offer this essay
as a partialaccount of what it is for a judge to havea philosophy
of law. But my main purposehere is to explore whetherthere is
an alternativeworking conception that might be better than the
influentialnotion that law consistsof pre-existingrules - better
in that (1) it would be a more serviceableworkingconception as
such; or (2) its normativeeffects would be preferable;or (3) the
consequencesof judicialobsessionwith it wouldbe less untoward;
or (4) some combinationof the foregoing. I believe there is a
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better alternative working conception, and it is one in which
morality plays a major part.
3. THE NATURE

OF A WORKING

CONCEPTION

I must first discuss what I take a working conception to be, and I
will continue to use the notion of "law as pre-existing rule" for
illustrative purposes.
As I conceive it, a working conception is not the same as what
Professor Hart has called a "criterion of legal validity."8 Such a
conception might specify a feature required for a form of law to
be valid within a system, but it need not. Thus a criterion of legal
validity within a society might, for example, be that the law, whatever form it happens to take, must be promulgated by Rex. And
judges might have a working conception of the law as "rules made
by Rex." Yet judges in this society might hold a working conception of the law devoid of any reference to Rex, too. Virtually all
all of them might conceive of "the law" simply as pre-existing
rules (and there might be few other social rules). Furthermore, as
I conceive it, a working notion of the law is not as such binding
upon a judge, whereas a true criterion of legal validity is.
A working conception is not the same as a working hypothesis
as to the likely actual substantive content of relevant law.9 Rather,
it is "prior" to any such hypothesis. It is a kind of conceptual
schema, and it may be one that can accommodate almost any
particular substantive content.
Nor is a working notion necessarily the same as an "ideal type"
of law.10 It is possible to imagine, for example, an ideal type of a
8

H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961),

chapter6.
9

Similarly, it is not the same as a "hunch" as to the right result in a case.
See Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., 'The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the
"Hunch" in Judicial Decision', Comell Law Quarterly 14 (1928/9): 274288.
10 I refer here to Weber's notion of an "ideal type." See his 'Religious Rejections of the World and their Directions', in From Max Weber: Essays in
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legal rule - one that is precise,clear,prospective,and in still other
ways formallyideal. A notion of "the law as pre-existingrule"
could, however,qualify as a workingconceptioneven if the concept of a ruleembodiedin it did not havesuch features.
My notion of a workingidea is one in which "the law" is conceptualizedin termsof one, or at most two types of recurrentnormative phenomenaof "the law." These phenomenamay also be
thought of as "justificatoryresources";they are themselvesvaried
and complex,and,in Anglo-American
systems,include:
(a)
pre-existingrules,
actual
reasonsfor those rules,
(b)
(c)
equitiesbetween the partiesoutsideany relevantrules,
(d)
discretionaryjudgment (includingthat involved in the
overrulingor modificationof precedent),
the bearingof ideas of justice and the common good
(e)
found in some formsof law,
characteristically
the generaldictates of reason,including"goal"reasons
(f)
(g)

and "rightness" reasons, relevant to the justification of
judicial decisions, and
fiat.

A working conception, however, leaves things out; it is only a partial schematization. Thus, for example, judges who adopt a working conception of "the law" as pre-existing rules adopt a notion
that leaves out the foregoing other important normative phenomena of the law that may also be relevant to issues for decision.
(Many judges who hold a rule conception also incorporate the
reason or reasons for the rules, too.)

But that a particular conception leaves out important phenomena of "the law" is in itself not a criticism of that notion as a

working conception. In my view, to be serviceable to the usual
judge, such a notion must be partial and selective. Only the ablest
Sociology, edited by H. H. Gerth and C. WrightMills (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1946), pp. 323-359. The editors of this volume also discuss
Weber'snotion at pp. 59-61 of their Introduction.
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judge could wield a working conception qua working conception
that encompasses all normative phenomena of "the law." (On this,
more later.) Furthermore, a conception that meets the five threshold requirements of a viable working conception (soon to be set
forth) will, on its own, serve a judge well in a substantial proportion of cases. That is, he will not have to resort to other phenomena of the law to dispose of these cases appropriately. Indeed, this
is one factor that accounts for the widespread judicial resort to a
rule conception. The phenomena of the law relevant to decision
just do consist, in a significant proportion of cases, of pre-existing
rules (and the reasons therefor). Thus in all such cases the inevitably partial nature of a working conception can hardly be prejudicial or dysfunctional. Indeed that characterization may be
thought of as part of the very "beauty" of a viable working conception. Of course, even in the cases to which a working conception readily applies and which would lead to an analysis that
ought to be determinative, it is still possible for judges to go
wrong. A working conception is not aguarantee.
It does not follow, however, that if a judge brings a serviceable
working conception to an issue for decision this judge must, ought
to, or will decide that issue solely in light of the general feature or
features of phenomena of "the law" embodied in that conception.
On the contrary, the judge ought to decide in light of phenomena
of the law that emerge as relevant and appropriate bases for
decision, even when these phenomena turn out, in the circumstances, not to be incorporated in his working conception. And, on my
account, the judge who is not unduly influenced by his working
conception will generally so decide. After all, his conception is
only a working idea.
In my view, a viable working conception of the law is, however,
a pragmatic necessity for the usual judge. When performing intellectual operations with the law, this judge needs some general
notion of what he is performing them on, and for. A working conception of "the law" is such a notion. Note that I do not claim
that a working conception is a conceptual necessity. And some
judges may get along without any such idea.
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In a relatedway, a viableworkingidea of the law is functionally
serviceable.One conception may be preferableto another on
groundsof comparativeserviceability.First, it mightfacilitatethe
identification of pre-existing law better than some other general

idea. For example,in Anglo-American
systems,a rule conception
would more often lead judges to relevantauthoritativematerials
than would an "unfettereddiscretion"notion of law. Second,one
conception may put the judge on to a better interpretational
method than another. Thus a notion of the law as a reasoned
reconciliationof conflicting considerationswould lead the usual

judge to interpret statutes, for example, in accord with their
rationales more readily than would a rule conception (at least if

the latter itself omitted rationales).Third,one conception might,
better than any other, facilitatethe identificationand resolution
of issues callingfor the creationof new law. It shouldbe evident,
for example, that the notion of law as pre-existingrule provides
little sustenance to the judge who must decide a case of first
impression.A workingconceptionmay be serviceablein still other
ways, too.

Before a conceptioncan be at all adequatelyserviceablein the
foregoingways, it must satisfy five "criteriaof viability"which I
will now sketch (and only that). Since the idea of law as pre-existing rule satisfiesthese criteria,I will illustrateeach criterionwith
it.

First, an idea cannot qualify if not faithful to law's reality.

Obviously,ideas of space exploration,or of the modernnovel, are

essentially foreign to law and thus cannot count as, or figure in,
what I call a working notion of the law. Pre-existingrules, on the
other hand, are not at all foreign to the law, and thus readily
qualify. (Of course, this is not to say that the whole of the law
consists of rules or that rules are law.)
Second, the notion must be sufficiently unitary. Otherwise, it
cannot be serviceable as a working conception (at least for the
ordinary judge). Again, the pre-existing rule idea qualifies, even if
reasons for the rules are included. Such a conception would thus
embody three related elements: rule, reasons, and pre-existence.
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Of course, an unusuallyablejudge mighthave a conceptionthat is
"total" and thus embodiesall phenomenaof the law. But any such

all-encompassing conception could not be of service to the usual

judge. It would be too complex,and thus too cumbersomefor him
to "wield all at once." And it would not be sufficiently "selective."
Third, since in our systems, law ranges over nearly every nook

and cranny of social life, a serviceable working idea of "the law"
must be widely applicable - not narrowly pocketed or restricted
to specific varieties of social relations. Again, a rule conception

qualifies. This is not to say that pre-existing rules exist for, or are
justifiably applicable to, all, or even the overwhelming majority of,
issues arising for decision.
Fourth, the phenomenon, or phenomena, of the law picked out
by a working conception must be sufficiently represented or
instantiated numerically within the totality of legal phenomena.
Thus, a phenomenon that rarely recurs could not qualify. For
example,

the relation of circular priority in mortgage law could

not. Nor could "adverse possession." But pre-existing rules could.
Rules are ubiquitous in the law.
Fifth, the conception must not be vacuous or unduly indeterminate. The notion of law as pre-existing rules satisfies this criterion, too. (On this, more later.)

A viable working conception is one that is functionally serviceable. It facilitates the identification of relevant law, the adoption
of sound interpretational method, the application of reason afresh
when called for, and more. To be serviceable in such ways, a working conception must sufficiently satisfy the foregoing criteria of
viability.
It does not follow, however, that a serviceable working conception. There are two basic forms that this can take in the case of
trary, a judge may be unduly influenced by any working conception. There are two basic forms given this can take in the case of
a judge who holds a rule conception. First, let us assume that the
rule notion is prima facie applicable to the issue at hand (the issue
is one to which some version of a pre-existing rule is actually
relevant). Even so, it may be that in the end the particular rule
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should not control; yet our judge may fail to see this. For
example, reason may reveal that the rule is the harshest doctrine
of the common law and require that it be overruled. Or, for
example, it may be that equities between the parties have arisen in
the particular case (for which the rule does not provide) and these
ought to control.11 Second, our preoccupied judge may fail to see
that his working conception of the law as pre-existing rule is not
even prima facie applicable to the issue at hand, for the case is a
genuine case of first impression, or a statutory casus omissus. In
these cases there is no pre-existing rule, yet our judge acts as if
there were, by, for example, invoking a far-fetched analogy.
4. POSSIBLE WORKING CONCEPTIONS

I have already said that a conception of "the law" as pre-existing
rule qualifies as one possible working conception and that many
judges actually hold this idea. I have also said that some judges
become obsessed with it, and that this helps account for some bad
outcomes. But in my view, nothing inherent in the nature of law,
or of the judge's role, requires that a judge hold this particular
working idea. I will now consider whether certain other possibilities also satisfy the relevant qualifying criteria of viability. Among
these are the following (each of which, except perhaps the first,
has some actual subscribers among judges):
The law is whatever the equities between the parties dic(1)
tate in the particularcase.
This possible working conception fails to qualify for lack of
sufficient numerical significance (fourth criterion). In a very high
proportion of cases, there are no relevant "equities" between the
parties (or the equities are not appropriately determinative).
The law is whatever the official organs of final applica(2)
tion within the system say it is.
1 On the natureof such equities, see Robert S. Summers,'GeneralEquitable
Principlesunder Section 1-103 of the Uniform CommercialCode', NorthwesternLaw Review 72 (1978): 906.
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This candidate might be called the "unfettered discretion" or
"free law" idea. Although popular in some jurisprudential circles,
it cannot qualify either. At least in Anglo-American systems, it
lacks the required phenomenological felicity (first criterion). The
law in these systems is not (and never has been) a game of scorer's
discretion. A judge is almost never free to take the view that the
law is entirely "up to me."
The law consists of certain characteristic substantive
(3)
ideas of justice and of the common good.
Of course, we do have certain received ideas of justice and the
common good, and some of these may even be more or less
characteristic of the content of much law, at least in Anglo-American legal systems. But this candidate fails, nonetheless. The relevant ideas do not have sufficient range and bearing, given the
diverse, and detailed, nature of the issues judges must face (third
and fifth criteria). Moreover, some notions of justice and the common good have been (and are) more ideal than real and thus lack
sufficient phenomenological felicity (first criterion). Laws applicable to blacks in the Southern United States until after World War
II are perhaps most dramatically illustrative (within recent AngloAmerican legal history).
The law is a reasoned reconciliation of conflicting con(4)
siderations.
Hereafter I will refer to the foregoing as the "reason conception" or as the notion of "law as reason" (not to be confused with
that of Aquinas). Does this notion qualify as a viable working conception?
First, it is phenomenologically felicitous. Reasoned resolutions
are not at all foreign to the law. Of course, this is not to say that
these resolutions are always sound. Nor is it to say that reason
properly rules all. Some role for fiat in the law is inevitable (as, for
example, in determining the number of years required for an
adverse possessor to get title).12
12

See generally Lon L. Fuller, 'Reason and Fiat in Case Law', Harvard Law
Review 59 (1945/6): 376-395.
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Second, a reason conception is sufficiently unitary.
Third, the scope and potential bearing of the notion of law as
reason is sufficient. Indeed, it may be the most wide-ranging of
candidates.
Fourth, the relevance of the idea of reasoned resolution is sufficiently recurrent to qualify as a working conception. That is, it
would regularly "come into play."
Fifth, the notion of law as reason is not unduly indeterminate
or vague. Over a wide range of issues, the weight of reason is often
heavily on one side.13 It is also possible to define and analyse the
types of substantive reasons that rationally figure in deciding and
justifying court decisions (something I have attempted elsewhere).14
These types are twofold: "goal reasons" and "rightness reasons."
A goal reason derives its justificatory force from the fact that, at
the time it is given, the decision it supports can be predicted to
have effects that serve a good goal. (The goal may or may not have
been previously recognized in the law.) A good rightness reason
does not derive its justificatory force from predicted goal-serving
effects of the decision it supports. Rather, it draws its force from
the way in which the decision accords with a moral norm of rightness as applied to a party's actions or to a state of affairs resulting
from those actions. Most rightness reasons are past-regarding they have to do with how the case came about. All goal reasons
are future-regarding.(Of course, a goal reason may have to do with
bringing about more rightness.) Judges know how to construct and
evaluate reasons of both types. Thus, "reason" is not a vague and
vacuous category that frees judges to import their own personal
prejudice and bias in the guise of reason. Moreover, a judge committed to a working conception in the form of a reasoned reconciliation of conflicting considerations will be opposed to deciding
cases on the basis merely of personal prejudice, bias, or idiosyn13 ibid.

14 Robert S. Summers,'Two
Types of SubstantiveReasons: The Core of a
Theory of Common-LawJustification', Cornell Law Review 63 (1977/8):
707-788.
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cratic views. It does not follow that such a judge will, by virtueof
his commitment,always reach the best justifiedresultin the case.
Again,a workingconceptionis not a guarantee.
It may forestall misunderstanding
if I stress once more that a

judge who rationally depends upon a working conception does

not, however, ignore phenomenaof the law not embodied in his
conception. Thus a judge who harborsa reason conception ought
to abandonits dictatesif reasonand the legal materialsrelevantto
the problem turn out to counsel as much. For example, such a
judge may end up applyinga pre-existingrule.Just becausea judge
typically thinks in the first instance of law as reason it does not

follow that he cannot also believe in rules or the rule of law.
Similarly,a judge who harborsa rule conceptionmay even end up
overrulinga precedentthat he in the end thinks goes beyond the
bounds of reason (e.g., the complete bar rule of Butterfield v.
Forrester). It is one thing to have a working conception and
anotherto be undulyinfluencedby it. A judge who is not obsessed
will depart from the dictates of his workingnotion as circumstances demand.A workingnotion is only that. It is only a partialand
nonbindingschematizationof the law, and the methodologically
selfconsciousjudge will treat it as such. Generally,then, two different judges, one with a reasonconception and the other a rule
conception, will, if not obsessed,end up decidingthe same issues
in the sameway.
Even so, there is still much to choose between if one is consideringwhetherit is better for a judge to hold a rule or a reason
conception.
5. THE "REASON" AND THE "RULE" ALTERNATIVES:
SOME COMPARISONS

Given that the notion of law as a reasonedresolutionqualifiesas a
possible working conception, the further question arises: Is the
reason alternativebetter than the more widely held rule notion?
I will, in this section, compare these alternatives on two grounds:

serviceability,and normative"sideeffects."
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A. Comparative Serviceability
It is not possible here to compare exhaustively the efficacy of the
two main alternatives. I will treat efficacy for judges, and then
only in relation to what I conceive to be three primary functions
of a working conception. At this exploratory stage, my conclusions
can be only tentative.
One primary function of any working conception is to facilitate
the identification of relevant pre-existing normative phenomena
(justificatory resources) of the law. It may be that the notion of
law as reason can fulfill this function better than the rule idea. It
caters for more varieties of pre-existing law than does the rule conception. In general, reason figures prominently in the law, including
the content of pre-existing rules. It follows that when a judge
seeks to determine relevant forms of pre-existing law he may
safely assume these to be phenomena in which reason somehow
significantly figures, except when fiat necessarily holds sway, or
when predecessors have simply failed to bring reason to bear at all
(and this is rare). These latter two exceptional varieties of law for
which a reason conception does not cater in the processes by
which judges determine relevant pre-existing law must be compared with varieties for which a rules notion does not cater. These
latter varieties include: (1) law governing exercises of discretion in
accord with substantive criteria not reducible to rule; (2) law in
the form of "equities" between the parties in the particular case equities themselves not specifiable in rules; (3) law in the form
merely of case law "holdings" with accompanying reasons (not
readily reducible to rule). Even if the rule notion is one that also
incorporates the reasons behind the rules, it is not at all evident
that it would then cater for the foregoing important varieties of
"non-rule" law. In sum, the rule notion ranges over far less of the
normative phenomena of the law than the reason conception.
Moreover, I believe that the reason notion "takes hold" in a
higher proportion of the total instances of law identification than
does the rule notion. To put this another way, the proportion of
instances in which the pre-existing law to be identified consists of
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fiat (necessarily)or of failed reasonis farsmallerthan the proportion of instances in which pre-existinglaw does not consist of
rules.
A second primaryfunction of a workingconceptionis to facilitate the sound interpretationof relevant pre-existinglaw once
identified.Muchpre-existinglaw requiresinterpretation.Yet there
are basic alternativeapproachesto interpretation- the literaland
the rationale-oriented.15
Though I cannot go into this here, the
latter is vastly superior.Thus a workingconceptionthat tends to
put judges on to the rationale-orientedapproachis, in my view,
the more serviceable.I think the notion of law as a reasoned
reconciliationof conflictingconsiderationsdoes just this. It more
or less naturallycalls for a rationale-oriented
approach,for the law
itself is conceived mainly in such terms. A conception of law as
rules, on the other hand,is at best moreor less neutralas between
the literal and the rationale-oriented,and a case can be madethat
the rule notion and the literalare far morecongenialthan the rule
notion and the rationale-oriented.This is, I think, certainlytrue if
the rule conceptionis one that does not also incorporatereasons
behind the rules. And even if it does, some differenceson this
score may still remain.
A third primaryfunction of a workingconceptionis to facilitate the identificationand resolution of issues callingfor creation
of new law. The rule conception presupposesthat the law takes
the form of a pre-existingrule.Thuswhen new legalneeds arise,a
judge must immediatelyturnawayfromthisconception(exceptfor
such sustenanceas it may provideby analogy).On the other hand,
a judge who holds a reasonconceptionwill find that it, as such,
standshim in good stead when new legalneedsarise.It recognizes
that much of the law is not "pre-existing"but mustbe madeup in
light of reason as we go along. The law is not something that
simply "is the case" - a hard chunk of reality. Rather"the law"
must often be argued for. Gaps in the law present themselves.
Authorities come into conflict. Mistakesand misjudgmentsoccur
15 There is a vast legal literatureon these two approaches.
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(as in the doctrine of Butterfield v. Forrester). Change brings new
needs and renders old law obsolete. Interpretation itself imposes
creative demands. Thus numerous issues of varying types arise for
which pre-existing rules provide no, or only an inadequate,
solution, and to which reason must be applied afresh. The
superiority of a reason conception is evident, too, when it is
recalled that frequently a sharp line cannot be drawn between preexisting law and new law anyway. The rule conception requires
that such a line be drawn.16
I should concede at this point that for the ablest judges it may
be that neither alternative working conception is any more, or less,
serviceable than the other in any of the foregoing three ways.
These judges will be relatively less dependent on working conceptions, and may on their own readily identify relevant law, adopt
preferred interpretational method, and come to grips with
problems of making new law from scratch. (It may also be true
that the ablest, and perhaps even the abler,judges will only rarely
become obsessed with a working conception. On this, more later.)
B. "Normative" Side Effects
Pursuit of each basic alternativeworking idea has subtle normative
implications for judges generally. The most general norm
"implied" for other judges who learn that a judge is following a
rule idea might be formulated: "Generallydo things by well-made
rule." Similarly, the norm "implied" by the reason notion would
be: "Generally do things by sound reason." We may assume that
the side effects of the former would include an increase in the
proportion of well-formed rules within the system, and the side
effects of the latter, more soundly reasoned resolutions than
otherwise.
In moral and political terms, what might be the general comparative value of the two types of side effects, assuming that they
16
See further Robert S. Summers, 'Professor Fuller's Jurisprudence and
America's Dominant Philosophy of Law', Harvard Law Review 92 (1978/9):
433-449.
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turn out to be roughly equivalent quantitatively? (This is a large
assumption, but empirical study of relative quantity would be
exceedingly difficult if not impossible.) I will begin by trying to
put the case for the importance of rules as strongly as I can.
In a variety of ways it could be valuable for a given society to
have more rules (and better formed ones) than it actually has.17
Rules can restrict scope for official arbitrariness, secure that like
cases (as marked out by the law) are treated alike, bring regularity
and predictability, and facilitate "followability" of the law and
"self-regulation."
Relatedly, rules are among the things that enable us to have
confidence in officials. When citizens know that officials must
follow known rules this diminishes an important source of insecurity. Citizens "know where they stand." And they also know
it is at least harder for officials discriminatorily to victimize an
individual under a regime of known rules, for rules apply to all
who fall within their terms.
A requirement that officials proceed by known rule (where
appropriate) may exert pressure for sound substantive content.
At least demands for justification will be heard more often and
with more focus under a regime of known rules than under a
regime in which officials proceed ad hoc. Moreover, if officials
address themselves only to particulars of the case at hand, they
will not do as well at weeding out irrelevancy as they would if
forced to formulate and follow general rules.
Further, procedural rules define features of legal processes
required for the regular realization of "process values," e.g., fairness and participation.18 Without a sufficient number of wellformed rules, this form of value realization would significantly
diminish.
17 For a recent book devoted in major part to this theme, see Kenneth C.
Davis, DiscretionaryJustice: A PreliminaryInquiry (Urbana,Ill.: University
of Illinois Press,1971).
18 See Robert S. Summers,
'Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes A Plea for "Process Values",' Cornell Law Review 60 (1974/5): 1-52.
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Rules also serve as required means, more or less, to substantive
ends. A full articulation of how this is so would take us far afield.
It is enough for my purposes to cite examples. Without known
rules, a value of such importance as liberty would be far harder to
secure, for rules demarcate boundaries with distinctive efficacy
and thus enable citizens to plan and choose on their own within
these boundaries. Without rules, the welfare state as we know it
would be impossible, for it would be impossible to set up and run
an effective system of taxation. Without rules, dispute settlement
by adjudication (with its distinctive "process" and other values)
would also be far less effective. Rules structure adjudicative
processes to provide fair participation, and also establish standards
for defining the issues and determining what is relevant.
Corporations, trusts, and other "legal inventions" are creatures
of rules and thus could not exist without them. Indeed, centralized government itself would probably be impossible in a complex society without rules defining roles in the required division
of legal labor. This is not only because in a sizeable society any
such division must be elaborate and complex. It is also because the
officialdom could not command legitimacy, for there would
simply be no sufficiently defined governmental set-up to serve as
the object of this legitimacy.
Rules also distinctively facilitate private ordering of affairs
without official intervention. They can guide and induce private
parties not to interfere with others, and enable private parties to
coordinate their activities. Without firm and known rules, there
would be far more interference with each other's plans, and far
less effective social coordination. Elemental rules of the criminal
law and basic rules of the road are aptly illustrative.
In sum, rules can help bring many values to social life. Resort to
them is to be encouraged, as appropriate. Whenjudges harbor and
publicly act upon a working conception of law as pre-existing
rule, they presumably encourage each other generally to resort to
rules - and doubtless we end up with more (and presumably
better formed) rules than we otherwise would have.
What of sound reason in matters legal? Well-formed rules may
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even be evil in content. And sound content is widely called for in
the law, not just in those provinces governable by rules. Except
when reason peters out and fiat is necessarily called for, soundly
reasoned content is always possible in law, too. Yet in a significant
proportion of cases the content of American law, at least, is not
sound. The "rule" of Butterfield v. Forrester that contributory
negligence of a plaintiff is a complete bar to any recovery, though
extreme, is only one of many examples (though it is now being
overhauled).
If more judges were to adopt and publicly act upon a working
conception of the law as a reasoned reconciliation of conflicting
considerations, what would be the likely side effects? The corollary
norm for legal actors that this behavioral shift would "imply" is:
"Generally do things by sound reason." The side effects of thus
promoting this norm would presumably include more soundly
reasoned content than would otherwise exist.
It is not to me evident that the normative side effects of a working notion of law as reason would necessarily be less important
to individuals and society than the normative side effects of a law
as rules notion. Indeed, some theorists have even argued that a
system of law would not be possible without a certain "minimal"
core of soundly reasoned content.19 To the extent that the normative side effects of a reason conception contribute to maintenance
of this core of content, such effects would be of the most profound significance.
Rule proponents might argue that officials simply need more
encouragement to make rules than they do to act by reason.
Hence the likely normative side effects of following a rule conception are of greater value, and the case for this notion correspondingly stronger. Doubtless officials have often failed to make rules
when they could and should have. But substantive content
contrary to reason has been all too familiar in law, too. Indeed, in
this century, as never before, laws of the most heinous kind have
been operative within some societies for extended periods. Of
19 See H. L. A. Hart, The
Concept of Law, chapter 9.
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course, pre-existing levels could make a difference. A particular
society might, for example, be greatly deficient in rules. In that
event, the normative side effects of adopting and publicly acting
upon a rule conception would be all the more desirable, for a
time.
Thus far in this exploratory venture, I tentatively conclude: (1)
that in terms of their comparative efficacy in serving the primary
functions of a working conception, there is more to be said for
"the law as reason" than for "the law as rules"; and (2) that in
terms of the comparative value of their likely normative side
effects, any claim that the rule conception has an edge is at best
inconclusive.
6. THE "REASON" AND THE "RULE" ALTERNATIVES:
WHEN OFFICIALS BECOME PREOCCUPIED

CONSEQUENCES

Judges not merely hold and act on working notions of law in
desirable ways; they also become obsessed with them, and this
factor contributes to unwise decisions. It may be that one of the
two basic alternatives is preferable on the ground that general preoccupation with it has less objectionable consequences. To map
out such likely consequences would be no simple task. What I
offer here must also be less ambitious.20
I will first review how judicial obsession may show itself in
particular cases, and identify its main causes. Ajudge obsessed with
a working conception will not abandon it when that is the wise
course, but a judge who is not obsessed will readily turn to other
phenomena of the law, as appropriate. For example, a judge preoccupied with a working notion of the law as pre-existing rule will
be more inclined to tolerate even an exceedingly harsh rule
(Butterfield v. Forrester) than he will be to overrule or modify
that rule. This judge will also be less inclined to recognize a
20 It
might be that one of the two alternativesis preferableon the ground
that those who hold it will simply be less likely to become obsessed with it
in the first place. I cannot go into this here.
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genuine case of first impression for what it is and instead will tend
to cling even to a remote pre-existing rule "by analogy." Such a
judge will want to "distinguish" conflicting precedent rather than
confront the real choice at hand. Similarly, he will be disinclined
to create exceptions (for this will not appear "law-like"). Further,
a judge preoccupied merely with the idea that law consists of preexisting rules will, in my view, be more likely to read statutes and
case-law precepts literally rather than in light of their rationales,
for he will think of the latter as somehow unfaithful to the wording of the real law. And our obsessed judge will be inclined to
read case-law precepts and even statutes governing private consensual arrangements as if they always ousted general equitable principles that come into play in the particular case.
Similarly, a judge may become obsessed with a conception of
law as the reasoned reconciliation of conflicting considerations.
This might lead him, for example, to refuse to give a pre-existing
rule its appropriate due, or to make new law without sufficient
regard to how it harmonizes with existing law.
The foregoing examples are not exhaustive, but in each the
judge fails to see that a working conception, however useful
generally, has limits of its own. For a working notion of law is
only a "partial" schematization of the law's justificatory resources
that may have rational bearing. Thus there is more to phenomena
of the law than rules: equities in the particular case, appropriate
discretionary judgment, general ideas of justice and the common
good, reason as such, and more. Moreover, pre-existing rules may
simply not apply, and are thus limited in this way, too. Yet in
relevant instances of prejudicial preoccupation, the judge "plays
by the conception" - sticks to the idea of a pre-existing rule even when that is quite inappropriate because the particular rule
is inapplicable, or other facets of "the law" come into play (or
both of these).
At the same time, there is also more to phenomena of the law
than the reasoned reconciliation of conflicting considerations.
Thus there are rules (with the reasons for them). There is even fiat.
And more.
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Why do some judges become obsessed with their working
notions of law? First, if a given notion generally stands judges in
good stead, this may lead them to over-use it. In such instances,
judges fail to recognize that the conception, like any such idea, has
its limits. Second, a few judges may mechanically substitute their
working conception for close analysis of particulars. It thus
becomes a crutch, and an anodyne for the pains of reasoning.
Third, the normative influences of an adopted working conception
may be direct, too, and not confined merely to side effects. That
is, some judges may unconsciously take the conception directly as
a standard for what "the law" always ought to be, e.g., a preexisting rule, or some ideal of reason. Fourth, the working conception a judge has may lead him to lapse into a more or less habitual
predisposition that influences his decisions without rising to the
level of a normative influence.
Let us turn, then, to what a legal system as a whole would
presumably look like if it were to go awry and if this were attributable to widespread preoccupation with one or the other of the
two basic alternatives. I will take up the probable state of affairs
under a pre-existing rule conception first. Again, I offer rationalistic
speculation:
(1) "The law" would generally be "nailed down" in rules in
advance, even when discretion or other forms of open-endedness
would be more appropriate. This would bring more predictability
and equality before the law.
(2) The general quality of the substantive content of the rules
would decline, for predictability of outcomes under rules would
be the primary qualitative concern. It would generally be thought
more important to have predictable outcomes than to have rules
otherwise good. Also, there would be a tendency to think that
more issues are truly matters of fiat than would be so under a
regime of "reason legality."
(3) There would be general unresponsiveness to desires for
changes in existing rules, and the burden of proof would be
heavily on advocates for change. As a result the rules would
change relatively little, even when initially bad or later quite
outmoded.
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(4) Only in the most obvious cases would pre-existing common law rules be superseded by "equities arising in the particular
circumstances," and such equities would almost never displace
explicit statutory language, even when it deals with private consensual arrangements.
(5) Except for issues plainly political or ideological, few more
or less wholly new rules would be introduced. Thus it would be
widely assumed that novel cases of first impression and new
statutory needs are rare. (After all, it would be thought in the very
nature of law that it is something that pre-exists.)
(6) At least those judges who leave the reasons for the rules out
of their working conceptions would generally interpret and apply
law in accord with "plain meaning" and other literal methods
rather than in accord with rationale-oriented methods, for it
would be assumed that only the former are faithful to the true
rules (especially their wording).
The foregoing might be called an "excess of rule legality."
There might even today be legal systems that approximate the one
I have sketched. And widespread preoccupation with a working
idea of "the law" as pre-existing rule may significantly account
for such a system.
What might a legal system look like that has gone seriously awry
in circumstances in which this is significantly attributable to
widespread preoccupation with a notion of the law as a reasoned
reconciliation of conflicting considerations? My account here must
be even more speculative, for, to my knowledge, nothing approximating such a system has existed, at least not in recent times. We
do, however, know what it is like for a particular judge to be
obsessed with a reason conception, and it is possible to extrapolate
from this. In offering the account below of an "excess of reason
legality," I will be striving evenhandedly to characterizean opposite
polarity that is roughly the same "distance from mid point" as
the polarity of excessive rule legality I have already characterized.
(1) Formulations of "the law" in terms of rules would generally be left to the future, "for then we would know more." Hence,
less law would be "nailed down" in advance of specific occasions
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for applyingit, inasmuchas there would be a generaldesire to
leave scope for the free play of reason, and what is rationally
relevant(as well as its force) can be fully determinedonly in light
of the detailsof actualcasesas they arise.
(2) The quality of the substantivecontent of rules and other
forms of law would be the primaryconcern in lawmaking,and
predictabilityof outcome secondary. Thus, the general quality
of the content of law would improve,but there would be some
loss of predictability,and of evenhandedness.
(3) The existing law would tend to change more with mere
changes in personnel. For example, new judges would stand
ready to remake the law even though their notions of reason
might not differ much from those of predecessors.Predictability
would decline, and costly resourceswould be expendedas well.
Also, there would be losses in terms of evenhandedness- of
equalitybeforethe law.
(4) There would be ready responsivenessto demands for
changes in the law, especially demandsrooted in new developments requiringthat new ideas of reason be brought to bear.
This, too, would generatesome loss of predictabilityand would
likewise entail investment of more resourcesin lawmaking. It
overtime, too.
would diminishofficial evenhandedness
of
In
the
(5)
application law, any significantequities between
the partiesarisingin the particularcase would triumphover preexistingrule far moreoften than undera regimeof rule legality.
modes of interpretationwould generally
(6) Rationale-oriented
be brought to bear when applying the law, and in the guise of

these, judges and others would also sometimesbringin their own
merelypersonalnotions of reasonto interpretthe law.
The foregoingexcessesof "reasonlegality"are (in my view) the
main risksof widespreadpreoccupationwith a workingnotion of
law as the reasonedreconciliationof conflictingconsiderations.
Are these moreseriousthan the corresponding
risksof widespread
law
with
a
of
notion
as
preoccupation
working
pre-existingrules?
I cannothereconsiderthis issueat length.The biggestlosses under
the "regimeof reason" appearto be losses in predictability,in
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evenhandedness, in excessive diversion of resources into lawmaking
activities, and in, perhaps, undue substitution by some judges of
their own merely personal notions of reason. These strike me as,
on the whole, less serious than the widespread losses likely over
time under a "regime of rules," in terms of quality of substantive
content.
I, for one, would rather live under a regime run by officials
obsessed with reason than under a regime run by officials obsessed with rules. Of course, we need not choose between such
extremes. I merely suggest that if called upon to live under one
or the other, the reason regime seems less objectionable. The same
would be true, mutatis mutandis, even if, as is far more likely, the
society involved falls somewhere between the two extremes. Thus
it will not do to say that if some preoccupation with a working
conception is inevitable, it is better that this be with a rule rather
than a reason conception. Again, the starting point could, however,
make a difference. A particular society might be greatly deficient
in rules, for example. In that event, widespread resort to a rule
conception might be more desirable (for a time), even with the
excesses of rule legality that the inevitable preoccupations of some
judges would bring.
Given that many judges appear to hold a rule conception of
"the law," and given that some more or less inevitably become obsessed with the law as pre-existing rule, this factor may well be one
important explanation for the refusal of the court in Maki v.
Frelk to overrule the harshest doctrine of the common law. In any
event, it is almost certain that preoccupation with a reason conception would not have led the judges to their decision.
7. CONCLUSION

After hundreds of years in which a working conception of law as
pre-existing rule seems to have held sway, might it not be time for
judges generally to try reason as an alternative - for a few years
anyway? In my view, the serviceability of this alternative as a
working conception is superior. Also, the argument for a rule con-
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ception based on allegedly preferable normative effects is at best
inconclusive. Further, I believe the consequences of any obsession
with a reason conception would generally be less untoward.
But working conceptions are not like hats of the wrong fit.
They have to be unlearned, not merely removed. This kind of learning runs deep and becomes second nature. After a while, it may
not be unlearnable without resort to methods that would not be
acceptable. Thus the change I propose, even if desirable, is probably long off.
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